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ARGUMENT 
I. APPELLANT IS PROPERLY APPEALING 
Appellee Mower states that Jorgensen has not timely appealed; which 
is ironic considering Appellee's own brief was a month past the deadline and 
should itself be stricken. Mower overlooks the fact that Appellee has 
admitted that the December 12th, 2001 order is a change in the law in this 
case. The trespasses complained of in this case took place before that date. 
How could Appellant Jorgensen have appealed the application of a new 
order to events that occurred prior to the order being issued, yet not at issue? 
II. APPELLANT JORGENSEN NEVER STIPULATED TO A 
"PER SHEEP PER DAY" CLAUSE 
Appellee Mower's entire argument, and the trial courts rationale, 
hinges on one thing and one thing alone: Counsel for Jorgensen's single 
word answer to the trial court's question in October 2001, and that such 
answer be a stipulation. Without both of those being satisfied, Mower's 
argument fails. 
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A. Counsel for Appellant never stipulated 
A stipulation is an agreement between parties. First Of Denver 
Mortgage Investors v. C. N. Zundel & Assocs., 600 P.2d 521 (Utah 1975). 
There is no evidence that there was ever an agreement between the parties. 
Indeed, all evidence shows that Jorgensen never agreed to a $25 dollar per 
day per sheep damage amount. Mower can only point to one single, solitary 
event: an answer to a question by the trial court; and said answer is open to 
interpretation. 
The statement in question is this. "Is there an order in the file, Mr. 
Harmon[Jorgensen's prior counsel], that says pay $25.00 per sheep per 
day?" To which Mr. Harmon answered, "Yes." R. 269. This exchange is 
the sole evidence that Mower points to as a stipulation. There is no other 
evidence of an agreement, or even negotiations between the parties to 
interpret the previous order as providing a $25 per day per sheep damage 
amount. Thus, all Mower can do is attempt to make the answer to the trial 
courts question imply that Jorgensen stipulated to accepting the vastly higher 
damage amount. 
This exchange between the trial court and counsel for Jorgensen, 
however, does not establish a stipulation. The lower court did not ask if 
there had been any agreement between the parties. If the lower court had 
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asked something like "Is there an agreement, Mr. Harmon, that says pay 
$25.00 per sheep per day", with an answer of "yes," then that would be 
something Mower could point to as an agreement. 
In fact, though, the statement at issue was not a stipulation; it was a 
mistake on the part of Jorgensen's former counsel. The court asked counsel 
a question: "Is there an order in the file that says pay $25 per sheep per day." 
At the time, of the hearing, there was the November 22, 2000 order in the 
file that did mention a fine of $25 dollars per day for trespassing sheep. 
The question, therefore, is whether Jorgensen's counsel was referring to the 
November 22, 2000 order, or whether there really was an agreement 
between Mower and Jorgenson to pay $25 per sheep per day for trespass. 
In reality, it's clear that there is no stipulation of fact. Counsel was 
answering a question from the court, not informing the court of any 
agreement to adjust the order on file. Appellee Mower has not introduced 
any other evidence at any stage of the proceedings that Appellant Jorgensen 
ever agreed to this change in the damages. Indeed, there is no earthly reason 
why Jorgenson would agree to change the damages in such a way (who 
voluntarily changes their damages to massively higher amounts for no 
equivalent concession?). 
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The question the lower court asked was equivalent to asking about the 
status of a law. For example: "Is there a law which states that murder is a 
crime, a misdemeanor?" If counsel answers "yes" to that question, was a 
stipulation made making murder a misdemeanor only? That, in essence, is 
what Mower's position is. The question of what an order on file states is not 
a fact that can be stipulated. An order can be modified by stipulation, it is 
true, but not what the actual content of the order means, which is a question 
of law for the court. Stipulations on questions of law are not binding on the 
court. First Of Denver Mortgage Investors v. C. N. Zundel & Assocs., 600 
P.2d 521, 527 (Utah 1975). 
In addition, Appellant Jorgensen notes that the December 2001 order 
only mentions the "per sheep per day" clause as pursuant to the November 
22, 2000 order. It did not state that the "per sheep per day" was a result of a 
stipulation. While that order does mention stipulations, it is clear that it is 
the facts of the trespass that were stipulated (number of sheep, etc.). 
Appellee Mower argues that Jorgensen nor his attorney objected at the 
October 17th, 2001 hearing, and thus should be bound. Instead of 
demonstrating acquiescence, it is more likely that no one recognized the 
alleged stipulation. After all, the trial court was asking about the existence 
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of a specific order; not whether there were any changes or agreements 
modifying orders. 
Appellee Mower also argues that if this Court overturns the trial court, 
that stipulations will no longer be reliable, leading to all sorts of theoretical 
horrors. This is simply incorrect. Jorgensen is not attacking the validity of 
factual stipulations, such as Jorgensen's own stipulation of a trespass. What 
Appellant Jorgensen is arguing that the trial court should do its own work; 
not ask the parties to do its work for it. The trial court asked about the 
existence of an order in the court file. Surely, it is the duty of the trial court 
to actually verify the existence of that order and its contents, especially 
when, like now, the decision is the heart of the case. Parties cannot just 
misrepresent the contents of an order in the case file to the court and expect 
it to be the law of the case. 
Under the Appellee's view, if the trial judge and counsel make a 
mistake in terms of the exact language of an order while discussing it in 
court, they are bound forevermore, never again able to correct their mistake. 
This is simply an absurd result. The trial court asked about the existence of 
an order saying 1)$25 dollars, 2) per trespassing sheep, and 3) per day. In 
fact, there was an order on file that contained two of those three elements; 
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leaving out the "per sheep" bit. It is not surprising that counsel agreed there 
was an order on file talking about such things. 
B. The per sheep per day fine became effective in 
December 2001. 
Assuming Appellee Mower is correct, however, and there was indeed 
an agreement wherein Jorgensen voluntarily agreed to astronomical damage 
sums (setting aside the patent absurdity of such an agreement), when was 
such a stipulation made? The trial court asked if such an agreement 
imposing a "per sheep per day" fine was in the file. There was no such 
agreement in the file. Not until the December 12th, 2001 order is there 
anything anywhere in the court file that states "per sheep per day." Thus, 
counsel's "yes" is wrong. No such order existed at the time he said there 
was. 
Counsel for Jorgensen cannot, by saying there was such an order, 
create one. If a childless man is asked if he has a child and he says yes, a 
child does not mystically spring into being. The same is true here. Counsel 
for Jorgensen was asked if there was an "order in the file that says pay 
$25.00 per sheep per day." Even though Counsel agreed, there was no such 
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order—and such an order cannot suddenly spring into being on demand. 
Only a court can issue an order, not an attorney. 
If there really had been an intent to actually enter into a stipulation, 
counsel for Jorgensen would have said something like "no, there is not an 
order stating that in the file, but we would like to stipulate to such a damages 
clause." 
This did not happen. Nowhere did Appellant Jorgensen or his counsel 
ever positively stipulate to any such clause or damages or rewriting of the 
orders. All counsel did was incorrectly answer a question. Without any 
other evidence of agreement or intention than an incorrect answer to a 
question, Appellee now maintains that such an incorrect answer is absolute 
incontrovertible proof that Appellant Jorgensen agreed to assume a huge 
measure of damages, merely for the fun of it since he received nothing in 
return for such a stipulation. 
C. The alleged stipulation is vague. 
It is also in doubt as to exactly what Appellant Jorgensen allegedly 
stipulated to. The question the trial court asked was if there was an order in 
the file stating to pay $25.00 per head per day, to which the answer was yes. 
What did Appellant Jorgensen stipulate to, except at the most the existence 
of such an order? He certainly cannot be held to agree with this order. 
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Nowhere did he agree to be bound by such an order. Jorgensen 
nowhere signed any statement demonstrating an intent to be bound by such a 
restriction. He did not agree to never appeal, to waive his rights to fight 
such an order. Acknowledgment of the existence of something does not 
demonstrate acceptance. Acknowledging the existence of murderers does 
not mean society must be forced to accept murder. Simply put, what was 
stipulated to must be examined. Higley v. Mcdonald, 685 P.2d 496 (Utah 
1984). 
Nowhere has Appellee Mower ever demonstrated that there was even 
discussions or negotiations, let alone agreement, involving changing the 
penalty from per day to per head per day. There is simply not the agreement 
necessary for a stipulation to be enforced. 
III. LAW OF THE CASE 
Apellee Mower provides much authority on the fact that oral stipulations are 
valid. This, of course, is not in dispute. However, what is in dispute is 
whether there was any stipulation made at all. As demonstrated supra, there 
was no stipulation made, and even if one was made, Appellant Jorgensen 
only stipulated to the existence of an order, not to being bound by the 
contents of said order. Quite simply, on December 12, 2001 the trial court 
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changed the remedy in this case to provide for a "per sheep per day" 
trespass. 
The trespasses complained of by Mower in the instant case took place 
before that day. Mower has, by not addressing it, admitted that the law of the 
case changed from the November 2000 order. Thus, it is clear that there was 
no "per sheep per day" fine in effect on the day of the trespasses complained 
of. Thus, it is clear error for the trial court to retroactively impose a change 
in the law of the case on prior events. 
Under the clearly erroneous standard set forth by Thurston v. Box 
Elder County, 892 P.2d 1034 (UT 1995), Appellant is also entitled to relief. 
Even under the abuse of discretion standard Appellee Mower is advocating, 
it is clear the trial court abused its discretion in failing to overturn its 
application of its order. 
Appellee Mower presents his own doomsday scenario of disastrous 
litigation, untrustworthy attorney's, and massive increases in time and 
money to litigate cases if stipulations are thrown out. But Appellant 
Jorgenson does not argue that stipulations are invalid. Rather, Jorgenson is 
arguing that trial courts have a duty to examine their case files. Counsel for 
Jorgensen said an order existed, incorrectly. The trial court controls the case 
file: it can check for itself. Mower's argument is a novel one, where trial 
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This, of course, is nonsense. How could Jorgensen possibly have 
known in December 2001 that in 2004 he would be waiving his rights to 
fight the December 2001 order when it was being applied to events 
occurring in October 2001? As Mower points out, waiver requires 
intentional relinquishment of a known right. How did Jorgensen 
intentionally waive his right to appeal for a trespass not even complained of? 
Clearly, Jorgensen has not waived his rights to appeal in this case. 
It is also of interest to note that the trespass Mower is complaining of 
took place before the December 2001 order, and not afterwards, when the 
new damage scheme went into effect. 
Mower also claims without the "per sheep per day" fine, that there is 
no deterrent value. This is not true, as seizure and selling procedures are 
still in place under the November 2000 order. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, it is clear that Appellant Jorgensen never 
made a stipulation at all, that such stipulation if made was vague, and that 
the "per sheep per day" fine was first instituted in December of 2001. Since 
the trespasses complained of took place before that date, no "per sheep per 
day" fine is applicable. Nor has Appellant Jorgensen waived his rights to 
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appeal. The trial courts refusal to reexamine the case and apply the prior 
damages clause from the November 20th, 2000 order should be reversed. 
DATED this JA 'day of March, 2006. 
Douglas Neeley 
Attorney for Plaintiff Appellant 
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